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Despite increasingly large scale social protection programmes in Africa, we have limited 
evidence on the political economy processes involved. We investigate community-based 
processes for food aid allocation and the role of political and social networks, using the case of 
Ethiopia in the aftermath of a serious drought. Local political authorities are in charge of food 
transfers, in terms of free food aid or via work programmes. We find that although targeting is 
clearly imperfect, free food aid is responsive to need, as well as targeted to households with less 
access to support from relatives or friends. We also find a strong correlation with political 
connections: households with close associates in official positions have more than 12 % higher 
probability of obtaining free food than households that are not well connected. This effect is 
large as it is equivalent to the impact of an increase in the initial living standard by 150 % on 
getting food aid. The correlation with political connections is specifically strong in the 
immediate aftermath of a drought. Payment for food-for-work is also about a third higher for 
those with political connections. Although these programmes appear to be responsive to need, 
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Increasingly large transfer programmes are in operation across the developing world, 
amid growing consensus that such programmes can form a key part of poverty reduction 
strategies (World Bank, 2006). Targeting is a central feature of these programmes, but 
concerns remain about the effectiveness of reaching the intended recipients. This paper 
investigates how targeted food transfers are allocated in Ethiopia, one of the poorest 
settings in the world.  
 
Targeting errors in transfer programmes are common across the world, as collecting 
information on eligibility is costly and self-selection by the needy is often neither 
technically nor politically feasible. Moreover, even in a world of perfect information 
targeting errors may occur, when actual allocations are based on criteria other than those 
based on objective need. There is considerable evidence on possible biases in food 
transfer delivery against the poor in Ethiopia, in terms of geography, demographics, 
gender or assets (Clay et al., 1999; Jayne et al. 2002, Coady et al. 2004; Gilligan and 
Hoddinott, 2007). Clay et al. (1999) for instance find that the primary beneficiaries of 
food aid programmes are those at both extremes of the need distribution: those with the 
least and those with the most food available. Much less is known about how transfers 
are actually reaching the final recipients. Food aid delivery in Ethiopia has long taken 
two main forms: food-for-work (FFW) and free food distribution (FFD). Each has 
different targeting criteria, even though the underlying mechanism is similar. This paper 
studies the local political economy of transfers in Ethiopia using micro-level data, by 
focusing on the role of social networks and political connections in the delivery of food 
aid.  
 
Food aid in Ethiopia is delivered using administrative targeting, with extensive 
decentralization. The amount of food to be allocated to each district (Wereda) is 
determined at the central government level. The actual beneficiary households for either 
free food or food-for-work are designated at the local community level, by the ‘Kebele’ 
committees. The Kebele is a locally elected administrative unit, with close links to 
local, district and national political processes. When only limited systematic 
information for targeting is available to central bureaucracies, decentralized community-
based systems for transfer delivery may offer a mechanism to ensure that the poor are  




served, as local government officials may have superior access to information about 
households in their community. Alderman (2002) for instance finds that local officials 
of a decentralized social assistance program in Albania in 1997 indeed had access to 
information about households not available to centralised authorities, and that this 
additional information got effectively used to improve poverty targeting relative to 
centralised indicator targeting methods.     
 
Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that using community-based institutions will 
deliver effective targeting (Conning and Kevane, 2002). Decentralizing the power to 
allocate free goods and services to local political organisations may offer voice to the 
poor, but it could also strengthen local elites and networks by offering scope for rent-
seeking and patronage (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000; Conning and Kevane, 2002). 
Whether this decentralization better represents the needs of the local population is 
dependent on the heterogeneity of preferences in the local population (Besley and Coate 
2003). It offers opportunities for targeting to reflect local conceptions of need and 
deprivation, but these conceptions are not necessarily pro-poor (Conning and Kevane 
2002). The evidence available, not least from South Asia, points to the crucial role of 
the local political economy in service delivery and decentralization (Pande, 2007; 
Besley et al., 2005; Galasso and Ravallion 2005). The evidence from Africa is very 
limited. 
 
Studying these processes in Africa, and not least in Ethiopia, is important. In the last ten 
years, Ethiopia has been the largest recipient of food aid just after North Korea (World 
Food Programme, 2006). Each account for around 10 per cent of total global food aid 
flows. Over this decade, typically about 5 to 14 million people were considered ‘at risk’ 
as part of international appeals and food aid was widely distributed via food-for-work 
and food aid programmes. In 2002-3, a large drought struck the country, leading to 
about 12.6 million people seriously affected, almost a fifth of the population, making it 
the most serious natural disaster affecting Ethiopia in recent decades, well beyond the 
1984-85 and 1973-74 famines in terms of people affected (data from EM-DAT, 2007). 
One of the largest recent relief operations is credited for avoiding widespread famine 
and crisis (WFP, 2006). In its aftermath, the Ethiopian government has started to roll 
out a massive safety net scheme, combining food-for-work, and food and cash transfers,  




as part of a programme to rebuild assets of the poor, the Productive Safety Net 
Programme (PSNP), aiming to reach 8 million people across the country.  
 
The current paper focuses on the targeting of food aid, through FFD and FFW, in the 
aftermath of the 2002-03 drought. Even though in some of the localities involved, the 
situation was more severe due to the drought, the transfer delivery system and local 
targeting was very similar to the system that has been in operation for many years, and 
indeed, to the local delivery system as part of the current PSNP. Furthermore, as many 
of the locations studied have been receiving food aid regularly before and after the 
period studied, the processes involved are not particularly linked to this particular 
drought episode. In order to investigate whether social networks and/or political 
connections are of relatively greater significance in the period right after the drought 
when the need is acute, or sometime after the drought when the need is only felt by 
some very deprived people, the analysis will be disaggregated into two periods, with 
period 1 denoting the first 7 months right after the drought (September 2002 – March 
2003) and period 2 denoting the 12 subsequent months (April 2003 – March 2004). 
Besides looking at the selection criteria, this paper also investigates whether social and 
political networks matter for the level of FFD and FFW rewards per recipient 
household, and for FFW, per day worked.   
 
The paper focuses exclusively on targeting issues. Other papers have addressed the 
analysis of the impact of the transfer programmes involved (Yamano et al., 2005; 
Gilligan and Hoddinott, 2007). Using the same data as used in this paper, and based on 
a matched difference-in-difference estimator, Gilligan and Hodinott (2007) found that 
both food-for-work and food aid programmes raised consumption growth considerably. 
Unconditional food transfers appear to have been better targeted to the poorer groups 
than food-for-work, which benefited households more in the middle or upper tail of the 
consumption distribution. Many other studies have nevertheless highlighted 
considerable variation in the effectiveness of targeting (Sharp, 1997; Clay et al., 1999; 
Jayne et al., 2001; Asfaw, 2006).
1 These studies generally have to make conclusions on 
targeting based on a relatively small information set on household and community 
characteristics, such as related to demographics, assets, education and experiences with 
drought and other shocks. This paper augments this analysis by looking at the local 
social and political correlates of food aid access.  





In its study of the role of social and political networks in access to food aid, the paper 
distinguishes between horizontal and vertical networks. The former refer to social 
contacts with similar degrees of power, while the latter refer to links between citizens 
and the political elite. Furthermore, the role of the informal social safety net (ISSN) is 
considered separately. The priors are that vertical networks in which a person is 
connected to the local political elite may well matter, given that the entire allocation 
process relies on the local Kebele committee making lists of eligible households. The 
role of horizontal networks may relate to being connected to others to obtain 
information, or even, as in the case of the informal insurance network, be able to share 
any transfers (as would be predicted by risk-sharing models, Dercon and Krishnan, 
2003; Attanasio and  Rios-Rull, 2000). Furthermore, the official targeting rules for food 
aid (and currently in operation for the PSNP) explicitly state that those households with 
family support or other means of social protection and support should not receive food 
aid (MoARD, 2004).  
 
We find that especially political connections seem to matter in the free food allocation 
process, though only clearly in the period right after the drought. In this period, 
targeting based on need seems to be only weakly significant. Sometime after the 
drought, however, targeting moves very significantly to those in need, and social and 
political network variables are no longer significant. Vertical connections play the most 
important role, but also the informal social security network of a household seems to be 
influencing the FFD process. Horizontal social networks in general, however, do not 
seem to have a significant impact on how free food is allocated among the households.  
As for access to FFW, we find that only labour supply characteristics such as ability to 
work significantly matter, whilst we do not find any evidence of selection based on 
economic need, neither in period 1 nor in period 2. Overall, social and political 
networks do not seem to matter for participation selection or days worked. However, we 
do find evidence that households with local political connections get significantly better 
rewarded in terms of cash or food receipts per working day and in total than households 
without such connections. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we discuss very briefly how food aid is 
targeted in Ethiopia. In section 3, we set up a conceptual framework in which we  




discuss the potential role of social and political networks in the free food distribution 
process and the food-for-work scheme. Section 4 offers a description of the data and 
some relevant summary statistics. Section 5 contains the empirical specifications, a 
discussion of the main problems potentially involved and the estimation results. Finally, 
a discussion of the results and some concluding remarks are provided in section 6.  
 
2. Food aid targeting in Ethiopia 
 
Food aid delivery in Ethiopia has historically taken two main forms: food-for-work 
(FFW) and free food distribution (FFD); only in the last few years, in the context of the 
PSNP, cash transfers, mainly via Cash-for-Work (CFW), have also begun to be used 
more systematically. There is a long-standing commitment by the government of 
Ethiopia to distribute the lion-share of food aid via food-for-work programmes related 
to public works. As food-for-work is only effective for those able to work, it is 
recognised that free transfers will remain an important part of any safety net system, not 
least during crisis situations.   
 
The drought of 2002-03 triggered such a potential crisis. A failure of the main rains in 
several crop-dependent areas resulted in food production estimates approximately 25 % 
below normal levels (FEWS NET 2002-03). Large amounts of food aid were pledged 
and delivered – nearly 1.5 million tonnes and its distribution was managed via the 
Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC). However, in the end, 
neither international partners nor the DPPC determine how food is distributed among 
households within the villages in Ethiopia. This fact is a direct consequence of the 
hierarchic nature of the food aid distribution process.  
 
Free food allocations are typically made in three stages. First, the DPPC allocates food 
to each district (Wereda). Then, for rural distribution, Wereda committees assign 
allocations to individual Peasant Associations (PAs) within their Wereda. In rural areas, 
the PA is the local ‘Kebele’, the lowest level of political administration, usually 
consisting of a relatively small number of villages. Finally, the Kebele leaders prepare a 
list of beneficiary households and distribution is carried out by members of the PA. A 
critical element of this process is that while the amount of food to be allocated to each  




Wereda is determined at the Federal level, the actual beneficiary households are 
designated at the local community (PA) level (Jayne, et al., 2001).  
 
In principle, the Kebele leadership is elected using some official procedures for free and 
fair elections, although in practice, political manipulation and historical political control 
by those in power at the national or regional level may cast doubt on the extent of local 
political competition (Pausewang and Aalen, 2002). In particular, voters tend to 
perceive the ruling party as agents of the state, and would be reluctant to upset them, as 
they are dependent on them for receipt of many benefits, such as access to health cards 
(offering entitlements to health services) or modern inputs. Although their evidence 
gathering can be questioned on methodological grounds, Human Rights Watch (2010) 
argued that safety net and other allocations are increasingly used for political purposes. 
Lefort (2007) argued that this leads the rural population to be first and foremost 
concerned to vote for the winning side, since to do otherwise carries intense risks to 
their welfare and even survival. Electoral competition only significantly increased by 
the 2005 elections. Its dramatic consequences led to serious repression afterwards. More 
recently, electoral competition has again been minimal. In the 2001 Kebele elections, no 
significant national electoral competition took place, and in rural areas, voters largely 
supported the ruling national coalition (the EPRDF). 
 
The official goal has long been that work-based allocation (as in Food-for-Work or 
Cash-for-Work) programmes account for 80 % of all distributions (WFP, 1995). These 
programmes are used to build community assets, such as dams and roads, whilst 
alleviating hunger. The selection of FFW participants in Ethiopia has followed widely 
different rules (Sharp, 1997). In some regions, the distribution process is similar as for 
FFD, where local community groups (e.g. PAs) choose households eligible for 
participation based on some underlying criteria such as land size, work ability and asset 
ownership. Programmes in other areas have occasionally used self-targeting schemes, 
which do not make use of administrative restrictions on participation, and where 
households self-select into the programme. In principle, self-selection programmes are 
designed in such a way that the programme is unattractive to any but the poorest. 
Commonly used self-selection mechanisms of FFW programmes have been to give out 
relatively low quality of food, to require queuing to receive the transfers and to pay out 
low wages (cash or in-kind) relative to the prevailing market wages (Sharp, 1997).  




However, while some of the empirical evidence finds that FFW effectively reach the 
intended beneficiaries (Von Braun et al., 1998; Gebremedhin and Swinton 2000), 
several studies have found evidence that also non-poor participate in FFW programmes 
(Sharp, 1997; Clay et al. 1999; Gebremedhin and Swinton 2000; Jayne et al., 2002). 
Sharp (1997) concludes that “[…] a careful literature search produced no Ethiopian 
examples of self-targeting employment schemes successfully selecting the poorest and 
excluding the better-off”. Several explanations for this have been given in the literature. 
Barrett and Clay (2003) argue that imperfect or missing factor markets, such as labour, 
land and finance markets, lead to the poor opting out of FFW whilst the rich self-select 
into them. The most common explanation, however, is that FFW wages are set too high 
relative to the prevailing market wages, often on purpose, to attract enough labour and 
to make the programme successful (Sharp, 1997). When wages are set too high, and 
given restrictions on funds, excess labour supply occurs, including labour from the non-
needy group. FFW employers will then have to ration participation in some way, 
potentially based on criteria other than objective need. In any case, as FFW employers 
are typically linked to the local Kebele, similar processes as in FFD end up being used 
in practice. 
 
3. The role of social and political networks in food transfers 
 
The role of social capital in affecting the well-being of households and the development 
of societies has received much attention in research (Coleman, 1988; Putnam et al. 
1993; Narayan and Pritchett, 1999; Grootaert et al., 2002; Durlauf and Fafchamps, 
2008). Its meaning, however, remains highly imprecise. Durlauf and Fafchamps (2008) 
conclude that the most successful theoretical studies of social capital and development 
are those in which the focus is not on social capital per se, but where social capital is 
modelled as a specific form of social network structure that affects individual outcomes. 
This contrasts to most studies, in which social capital is defined as a set of social 
resources of a community, such as trust and control (Coleman, 1988; Putnam et al., 
1993).   
 
To investigate the importance of social contacts for households within each community 
in the last stage of the food distribution process (through either FFD or FFW), the 
analysis concentrates on social networks at the household level instead of aggregate  




social capital at the community level. In the remainder of this paper, the term social 
networks is used to refer to social networks at this level.
2 We will however go a step 
further by highlighting the nature of the network relations within the network, focusing 
on the degree of political connectedness of the network, as a means of accessing 
benefits. 
 
The literature on social networks outlines various links between social networks and 
economic outcomes. Here, a distinction is made between the horizontal and vertical 
social network of a household. The former refers to social contacts with similar degrees 
of power, while the latter refers to links between the political elite (the PA leaders) and 
the household. Moreover, as part of either the horizontal social network and/or the 
vertical social network, we distinguish a subset denoted by informal social safety net 
(ISSN).  This only includes those households that the household can actually rely on in 
times of need. These distinctions matter for the discussion, since the roles of these 
networks in the food distribution process may differ.  
 
Three main micro-level properties of networks are considered here: their joint value as 
informal social insurance, their ability to improve information flows and their function 
as a source of favouritism. Informal insurance networks refer to the group of associates 
(friends, family, neighbours or others) on which one could rely in times of need. There 
is a large literature documenting their relevance in poor settings (Townsend, 1995; 
Dercon, 2002). Given that in closely knit societies, such as the communities studied in 
this paper, information on the presence of these networks may be relatively high, it may 
also feature in food aid targeting. In fact, one of the explicit targeting rules meant to be 
used for assessment at the community level is whether a person can rely on family 
support or other forms of social protection (MoARD, 2004). The Kebele leaders may 
therefore be less likely to offer food aid to those well connected in terms of informal 
insurance networks. However, the analysis will have to take into account that formal 
food aid targeting may well crowd out informal networks. Standard informal insurance 
models under enforcement constraints would directly predict this: food aid targeted to a 
particular person will change the outside options available and therefore increase 
incentives to leave the informal risk sharing groups (Cox and Jimenez, 1992; Attanasio 
and Rios-Rull, 2000; Cox et al., 2004). In line with these models, there is some 
evidence from Ethiopia using earlier rounds of the data set used in this paper that the  




presence of food aid in the community crowds out informal insurance (Dercon and 
Krishnan, 2003). In contrast, Lentz and Barrett (2005) do not find any evidence of such 
effects in Ethiopian food aid targeting.  
 
‘Horizontal’ social networks in the community may also affect targeting via their role in 
information transmission. In a world of imperfect information, social ties can provide an 
individual with useful information about opportunities and rights otherwise not 
available. This information advantage of social relations has typically been used to 
illustrate the importance of social networks in the job market (Granovetter, 1975). Its 
relevance for food aid targeting is obvious. Households that have a larger network have 
a higher probability of receiving information about potential food aid programmes 
compared to more excluded households. Belonging to a larger network may also allow 
more effective lobbying for support. 
 
Vertical connections, i.e. connections to those in power, amplify considerably the 
potential of these networks to acquire goods and services, as it provides more ready 
access to information on rights to support and availability of food aid. Moreover, 
vertical connections also improve upward information flows, in terms of signalling of 
need. This is likely to matter as the official allocation criteria remain vague, and Kebele 
leaders are likely to need to supplement observable household characteristics with other 
criteria. An improved information flow linked to ‘vertical’ connection cannot easily be 
distinguished from another intuitive link: political connections as a source of 
favouritism. It may well be that the PA leaders use their political power to manipulate 
actions in favour of households that they are vertically connected to, irrespective of 
whether these households need the food aid or not.
3  
 
This raises the potential for a whole series of other linked behaviours, documented 
elsewhere in rural settings, from vote buying by local leaders to repression (Pande, 
2007; Baland and Robinson, 2008). Political processes at the Peasant Association (and 
any other) level in Ethiopia are definitely not transparent, lacking clear checks and 
balances. The dependence of rural households on the Kebele committees for different 
benefits and services, such as health services and access to modern inputs and credit, 
implies that not just voting for the winning side, but also connectivity to those in power 
may well be crucial.   





A priori, there are several reasons why the effects of social and political networks may 
be relatively more important during crisis times and this will be formally tested further 
below. First, PA leaders may need time to properly assess objective need-based 
eligibility of all households. As long as such information is not yet available, the PA 
leaders will have to rely on information that is more readily available. Households that 
are politically connected will be able to signal their need more quickly. Second, it may 
take time for information on FFD and FFW to reach all needy households in the PA. 
Households with political connections will have more direct access to such information, 
and hence have comparative informational advantage to those households that are not 
vertically connected. Third, during crisis time, relatively more people are likely to be in 
need of food aid, and the demand for FFW opportunities is likely to be relatively high. 
Under such circumstances, local officials will have to ration participation in some way, 
using criteria different than objective need, such as social and political networks. PA 
leaders may argue that a needy household that can rely on other households through an 
informal social safety net needs public food aid less more urgently than a needy 
household without such social networks. Moreover, if it is required to choose between 
two equally needy households, local officials may prefer to give food aid to a household 
they are socially connected to.  
 
 4. Data source and descriptive statistics 
 
Our analysis uses data from the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS), a 
longitudinal household data set collected as part of a collaboration between the 
International Food Policy Research Institute, Addis Ababa University, and the Centre 
for the Study of African Economies, Oxford. The data set has been collected in seven 
rounds from 1994 to 2009 in 15 rural Ethiopian villages. In 9 of these villages, free food 
was distributed and food-for-work programmes were organised during the drought crisis 
in September 2002 – March 2004. As we focus on this drought episode, we use the data 
of these 9 villages and obtain a sample of 602 households in total.  Round 5 and 6 were 
collected in 1999 and 2004 respectively, and contain detailed information on the 
households’ pre-drought characteristics useful for targeting analysis, and their 
participation in the food aid programmes during and after the 2002 drought. They form 
the basis for the analysis. Across these villages, about 60 % of households received free  




food between September 2002 and March 2004. About 62 % of households participated 
in food-for-work programmes during this period. About 39 % benefited from both 
programmes. Splitting up this period into two, 42 % received free food aid during the 6 
month period immediately after the drought, 44 % during the subsequent one year 
period. The share of households participating in FFW programmes amounts to 57 % in 
both period 1 and period 2. About 25 % received free food in both periods and about 53 
% of the households participated in FFW in both periods, implying a bigger change in 
allocation of free food aid between the two periods than in FFW, which seems to have 
been largely to the same target group.  
 
Table 1 shows selected summary statistics for the characteristics of the households in 
the sample, distinguishing between those that received free food in 2002-2004, and 
those that did not, as well as those that participated in food-for-work programmes and 
those that did not. As part of the community survey in each village, PA leaders were 
asked to nominate the criteria they used to allocate food aid in their community. We 
obtain 7 different criteria, which are ranked from most to less frequently listed by the 
different PA leaders: people unable to work, old people, poor people, landless people, 
large families, people with limited livestock and female headed households. Broadly 
speaking, they could be viewed as consistent with the ‘official’ guidelines, which state 
that food aid should be given to those that are facing serious food shortages (defined as 
deficiencies in food availability for three months or more), those that experienced a 
serious loss of assets without means to support themselves or those without family 
support or other means of protection (MoARD, 2004). Ethiopian food aid policy states 
that only persons that are unable to work are eligible for free food (DPPC, 2000). Needy 
persons that are able to work are required to participate in FFW in order to obtain food 
aid.  
 
Most of the significant differences in characteristics between the beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries of FFD and FFW relate to differences in labour supply characteristics 
(table 1). Except for land ownership, there are no significant differences between any of 
the characteristics related to economic vulnerability (consumption and livestock 
ownership). For land size, the difference is only significant for FFW, and the difference 
is in the opposite direction than we would expect, with FFW participants having on 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The most significant difference in characteristics between beneficiary and non-
beneficiary groups is found in the average work ability score of the household head. 
This measure is an average score based on five different questions concerning the 
household head’s ability to do daily activities. Each question has four possible answers 
from not being able to perform the task at all (value 1) to being able to do it easily (the 
value 4).
4  The average score across the five questions offers an index of ability to work, 
ranging from one to four, where one is interpreted as not being able to work at all and 
four is interpreted as perfectly able to work. The results show that this score is on 
average significantly lower for free-food-receiving households than for non-free-food-
receiving households, and significantly higher for food-for-work-participants 
households than for non-FFW-participants. This criterion seems to be the most 
important criterion for food aid targeting among the criteria provided by the PA leaders. 
This result is not surprising, given that disability is also the most emphasised criterion 
for free food distribution by the DPPC (DPPC, 2000). 
 
Free-food-receiving households have on average a smaller household size than non-
free-food-receiving households, whilst FFW-participating households have on average 
more members than non-FFW-participating households. A priori, the expected 
household size effect is ambiguous, as larger households have more mouths to feed, but 
at the same time they are likely to have more able bodied members. Similar results are 
obtained for the average proportion of elderly in the household, with FFD and FFW 
participating households having on average respectively a higher and lower proportion 
of elderly. Finally, FFW participating households have on average a significantly lower 
share of female headed households than non-participating households. This difference is 
not significant for FFD, however.  
 
Table 2 shows other characteristics of the households in the survey sample, again 
distinguishing between beneficiary and non-beneficiary households, but this time based 
on different ways of conceptualizing social networks and political connections. We use 
three different measures, each capturing different types of networks, with different 
predictions on their role in food transfer allocation. First, we use a self-reported measure 
of the size of the informal social safety network (ISSN). In round 6 of the survey, we 
asked how many other households or individuals the household could rely on in times  




of need. This provides a direct measure of the informal insurance network. Because it 
focuses on potential support, it is superior to measures based on who actually received 
transfers from others, as required in most risk-sharing analysis within networks 
investigating whether consumption is smooth because of transfers (Fafchamps and 
Lund, 2003). Controlling for household resources, it is also likely to be a relevant 
indicator that the Kebele committee may have to look at in view of the official targeting 




Column 1 in table 2 suggests that this may indeed be the case for FFD, as free-food-
receiving households claim on average to have significantly more people to rely on than 
non-free-food receiving households. On average, a non-free-food receiver claims to 
have 10 persons to rely on, while a free-food-receiver claims to only have 7 persons to 
rely on.  Of course, other evidence on risk-sharing networks has shown that wealthier 
households may have larger networks (with the causality possibly going in either 
direction (De Weerdt, 2004; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007). Hence, we have to be 
careful in interpreting these correlations from this bivariate analysis. For FFW, 
however, there does not seem to be any significant difference between participating and 
non-participating households in terms of the number of people the household can rely 
on in times of need.  
 
To measure the broader horizontal social network of the households, we use the size of 
the largest iddir the household belonged to prior to the drought. The iddir is a funeral 
society. Members pay a contribution, in many cases monthly, and its benefits are that 
the group pays for the costs of a funeral of a member and any of its close relatives. 
Virtually all people in the sample are members of such a group, although in each 
Peasant Association many different groups exist. Dercon et al. (2006) discuss details of 
their functioning as a funeral group.  Hoddinott et al. (2005) and Krishnan and Sciubba 
(2009) document how members of iddirs also typically are linked in other ways, such as 
in the form of labour-sharing groups (to do particular agricultural tasks together). It is 
the most ubiquitous and a relatively egalitarian social institution in Ethiopia (Dercon et 
al., 2006).  As virtually everybody is a member of at least one iddir, we use the size of 
the largest iddir a person belongs to as our proxy for the network strength.
6 Table 2 
shows that the average size of the iddir the household belonged to prior to the drought  




was 83 for the non-free-food-receiving group, and 95 for the free-food-receiving group. 
However, the differences are not significant. Similarly, the differences in terms of 




Table 2: Characteristics of free-food-receiving (2002-2004) and non-free-food-
receiving households: Based on social networks
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means between 2 groups 















Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations; * = significant at 10%; **= significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1 %. 
The size of the iddir is expressed as the number of its members. If the household belonged to several iddirs, only the largest iddir 
was considered. For the binary variables the statistic used to test equality of proportions adjusted standard deviations appropriately.  
 
 
Finally, we explore a measure of political (vertical) connectivity. The most direct 
measure collected for our purposes was the simple question ‘Do any of your close 
associates (relatives (not parents), friends, patrons) hold an official position in this 
kebele?’. Note that all positions in the Kebele are effectively ‘political’, based on 
appointments by the political leadership.
7 Table 2 suggests that vertical social networks  




indeed matter in the food allocation process, both in FFD and FFW. Differences 
between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in terms of political connections are 
strongly significant, with about 30 % of the non-beneficiary households being 
politically connected, and about 45 % of the beneficiary households.  
 
In Table 1 and 2 we compared the average characteristics of FFD beneficiaries and 
FFW participants to the characteristics of FFD non-beneficiaries and FFW non-
participants respectively. Pooling the FFD and FFW beneficiaries together, we do not 
find any significant differences between the average beneficiary (either FFD and/or 
FFW) and the average non-beneficiary (neither FFD nor FFW) in terms of table 1 
characteristics (not reported). This is not surprising, given that most of the 
characteristics for which we found significant differences in table 1 relate to labour 
supply characteristics, for which the official targeting rules are symmetric for FFD and 
FFW. Hence, when taking the average the difference cancels out. However, significant 
differences similar to those found in table 2 apply when we compare the average food 
aid beneficiary to the average non-beneficiary. 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
  
5.1. Model specification 
Although we will model and discuss FFD and FFW participation separately, we will use 
similar estimation equations for both of them. First, we explore the probability of 
obtaining free food (FFD) or participating in food-for-work programmes (FFW) as a 
function of household characteristics based on the PA criteria, social and political 
networks and other exogenous attributes that we believe to be important. In particular, 
we will estimate the following equation: 
 
) , , , , , ( j ij ij ij ij ij ij Z X ISSN VSN HSN PAC f F        (1)   
 
We estimate a number of versions of this model, each with a different dependent 
variable and time period. In particular,  ij F is a dummy equal to one if household i in PA 
j received free food (for the FFD model) or participated in public works (for the FFW 
model). We first consider the probability of obtaining aid in the total period of 18  




months after Ethiopia got struck by the drought in 2002, i.e. period September 2002 – 
March 2004. In order to analyse whether the effect of social and political networks 
differs between the period right after the drought, when the need is more acute, and the 
period some-time after the drought, when only the most seriously affected households 
are likely to be most needy, we also split this period in two periods: the probability of 
obtaining food aid in the 7 months right after the drought struck Ethiopia (September 
2002 – March 2003) and the probability of obtaining food aid in the 12 subsequent 
months (April 2003 – March 2004).  
 
Vector ij PAC  contains household characteristics based on the PA criteria discussed in 
section 4; ij HSN ,  ij VSN and  ij ISSN represent the measures of the household endowment 
of respectively horizontal social networks (the iddir), vertical social networks (political 
connectivity) and the informal social safety network; ij X is a vector of other household 
characteristics; and  j Z is a vector of community characteristics. We will control for all 
these community-wide effects using Peasant Association fixed effects, capturing any 
between-village variation in food aid allocation, and identifying all targeting effects via 
within-village variation. As the dependent variable is binary, the model is estimated 
using a probit model. 
 
Based on our earlier discussion, the vector  ij PAC in the model consists of the following 
characteristics of the household: its work ability (proxied by the average work ability 
score of the household head); its proportion of elderly, its income level (proxied by its 
real consumption per capita); its land ownership (measured by hectare owned land per 
capita, including crops, grazing and garden); log of the household size; and a dummy 
for whether the household is female headed or not.
8  
 
The vector ij X consists of other household characteristics that have not been mentioned 
by the PA leaders, but that we expect to play a role in the food distribution process. 
While consumption measured in 1999 has value as a proxy for pre-crisis poverty, it may 
not capture immediate needs during the crisis of 2002-2004. We therefore also add 
some measures of idiosyncratic shocks including a dummy whether the household was 
affected by the drought in 2002-2003. Other broader measures of ‘need’ may include  




the proportion of children and elderly in the household. Furthermore, a dummy for 
whether the household head is literate (which could capture wealth or income earning 
potential, although also the ability to enforce access to food aid) and a dummy for 
whether the household belongs to the majority religion group of its Peasant Association 
(offering a further measure of horizontal networks). A further control relates to inertia in 
food aid distribution, in the form of a dummy for whether the household received food 
aid in the past (at any time between 1982 and 1999). Jayne et al. (2002) found that in 
the mid-1990s, food aid displayed substantial inertia: Weredas and households receiving 
food aid in the past tend to receive food aid again, controlling for a wide variety of 
characteristics and shocks. To some extent, this should not come to a surprise: one of 
the official guidelines for food aid delivery uses as a criterion to target households that 
have faced continuous food shortages and received food assistance. In short, inertia is 
part of policy, for rather benevolent reasons: to avoid the need to repeated assessment 
(so needy can get support when required without delay), although it can of course 
perpetuate any bias in allocation. Similarly, a Wereda is currently selected for the PSNP 
if it is chronically food insecure and has been a recipient of food aid for a significant 
period in the past (Sharp et al., 2006).  
 
All of the control variables, except for the average score of ability to work of the 
household head
9, are evaluated in 1999. This avoids potential simultaneity problems, 
since we are interested in food allocation between 2002 and 2004, a time period after 
1999. One could rightly point out that assets in 1999 could still be endogenous, since 
both food aid receipts in 2002-2004 and assets in 1999 are likely to be correlated with 
past food aid. However, since we include a dummy for past food aid in the regression 
(related to 1999), we can credibly avoid this problem.  
 
As has already been discussed in section 4, HSN, VSN and ISSN will be measured 
respectively by the size of the largest iddir the household was member of prior to the 
drought, a dummy for whether the household has close associates holding official 
positions, and the number of persons the household can actually rely on in times of 
need.  As argued before, political connections may influence the food allocation process 
through different paths. On the one hand they may improve information flows: vertical 
connections may provide households with direct access to information about beneficial 
services and may give signals to local officials about the household’s need. On the other  




hand, political connections can be a source of favouritism. Distinguishing between these 
explanations is not self-evident. One plausible hypothesis could be that if connections 
matter for information, then they are likely to be more important in larger communities, 
where information flows may be harder. In order to explore this, we will consider a 
further specification, where we add an interaction term between our political connection 
variable and the size of the community (PA) where the household lives. Note that PA 
size as a level effect is captured by the community fixed effects. If we do not find a 
significant positive effect of the interaction term, the information argument would seem 
less convincing relative to the favouritism argument. 
 
Besides modelling the selection criteria through a probit model, we also investigate 
whether social networks affect the amount of food aid received through FDD and FFW. 
We use the same specification as in (1), but now considering as dependent variable the 
value (in Birr) of the quantity of food and cash received in the 2
nd period (April 2003 – 
March 2004). Due to data limitations, we cannot model quantities received during the 
first 7 months right after the drought. We use an OLS model for those receiving aid in 
either form. One alternative would be to use a Tobit model for the entire sample, but it 
imposes strong restrictions on the role of explanatory variables, and it requires strong 
distributional assumptions on the errors for consistency. An alternative would be a 
Heckman selection model, but as there is no obvious source of identification of the first 
stage, identification occurs via non-linearities in the model, which again is not ideal. In 
any case, using a Tobit or Heckman selection model does not affect the findings.  
 
For FFW, we also investigate whether differences in the value of food/cash received 
through FFW are driven by differences in the total number of days worked in FFW 
programmes, or by differences in the daily wage (cash/food) received. We explore this 
further, with the same specification, using OLS regressions, limited to those households 
that participated in FFW in this second period.  
 
There are a number of potential problems with our estimation equations, especially in 
terms of identifying the impact of the network variables on access to food aid. A key 
issue is the potential endogeneity of these measures. For example, there may be 
simultaneity problems: networks and political connections may be affected by the  




process of food aid delivery. The robustness of the results to objections related to 
endogeneity will be discussed later. 
 
5.2 Free-food-distribution targeting results 
Table 3 gives the results concerning the determinants of FFD. Column (1) gives the 
marginal effects of various variables on the probability of obtaining food aid at any time 
between September 2002 and March 2004. Over this aggregated period, there is 
evidence of means based targeting within villages. Evaluated at the mean of all other 
variables, households at the 25
th percentile of log per capita consumption have an 
average probability of 65 percent of receiving free food. The probability declines to 58 
percent and 52 percent at the 75
th and 95
th percentile, respectively.  Note, however, that 
the ‘richest’ households still have more than 50 percent probability of obtaining food 
despite substantial numbers, including some of the poorest, not getting any aid. While 
free food distribution seems to be correlated with poverty measures such as 
consumption in 1999, it does not seem to be correlated with measures reflecting 
immediate post-famine needs, such as whether the household was affected by the 
drought.  Another significant determinant is the average work ability score of the 
household head. A one point increase of this score (score ranges from 1 to 4) decreases 
the probability of obtaining free food by 12 percentage points. Other strongly significant 
determinants are land ownership and log of household size, both having a large negative 
effect on the probability of obtaining free food. The negative effect of household size 
may be explained by the fact that for households with a given proportion of children and 
elderly, the absolute number of active members increases with household size, and 
therefore decreases the probability of obtaining free food. In short, food aid allocation is 
correlated with official targeting rules related to underlying poverty, as well as the 
relative exclusion of able bodied workers. Still, the marginal effects show that even with 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Another significant determinant is whether the household received free food at any time 
in the past between 1982 and 1999. Households that did receive free food in the past 
had 14 percentage points higher probability of receiving free food between 2002 and 
2004.  Again, this is consistent with official targeting rules that suggest taking into 
account earlier food aid receipts to determine eligibility, even if it reflects inertia, and 
the potential for serious targeting errors (Jayne et al., 2002). Jayne et al. found inertia at 
the community level – and our results show that this finding carries through to the 
household level. This finding may also be influenced by unobserved omitted variables: 
for example, these households may have a time-invariant, but to the researcher 
unobserved need for continuous food aid, while it may be observable for the Kebele 
administration.  
 
The results suggest that social networks in general are related to the food distribution 
process in September 2002 – March 2004. The Wald-statistic for joint significance of 
the social network variables is 11.89, which is equivalent to a p-value of 0.01. But the 
results also show that not all types of social networks matter equally. Households with 
political connections (vertical networks) had more than 12 percentage point higher 
probability of obtaining food aid in 2002-2004 than households that did not have 
associates holding official positions. The magnitude of this effect may seem small at 
first, but the practical importance of this effect becomes clear if you compare it to the 
effect of the other significant determinants of food aid targeting. Compare this effect to 
the effect of consumption, for instance. A one percent increase in consumption per 
capita is associated with a decrease in the probability of obtaining food aid of 0.08 
percentage points. This implies that, ceteris paribus, someone can be 150 % richer but 
have political connections and still get food aid with equal probability than someone 
else with no political connections.  
 
The number of people the household can rely on in times of need is significantly 
negatively related to food aid. For each additional person the household could rely on in 
times of need, the probability of obtaining food aid in 2002-2004 decreased with 0.7 
percentage points. The significance level does not decrease if included separately in the 
regression (not reported). This result implies that households with for instance 20 
people to rely on have, ceteris paribus, 14 % less probability of obtaining food aid.  
Given that the number of people to rely on ranges from 0 to 205 in our sample, with an  




overall average of 7.8 and more than 14 % of the sample having more than 15 persons 
to rely on, the magnitude of this effect can become quite significant for those persons 
with a large ISSN. The third social network type, horizontal connections measured by 
the size of the largest iddir the household belonged to prior to the drought, does not 
seem to be related to the food distribution process.  
 
In order to explore the hypothesis that the effects of social networks are relatively more 
important in the period right after the drought, and become less important some time 
after the drought, estimation in column (2) and (3) disaggregate the analysis into two 
different time periods: Period 1 denotes the period including the first 7 months right 
after the drought (September 2002 – March 2003) and period 2 denotes the subsequent 
12 months (April 2003 – March 2004). The results are strikingly consistent with our 
predictions outlined in section 3. In period 1, means-based targeting seems to be very 
weak, with the consumption effect being insignificant and land ownership and work 
ability of the household only being weakly significant. Evaluated at the mean value of 
all other characteristics, households at the 25
th, 75
th and 95
th percentile of consumption 
levels have respectively 42 %, 39 % and 37% probability of obtaining free food. As 
predicted, targeting in period 1 seems to rather be based on information more readily 
available, such as whether the household experienced a drought and whether a HH 
member died in the period preceding the drought. Moreover, social and political 
networks seem to play a significant role in period 1. As expected, in period 2 the 
targeting pattern seems to change in favour of the most vulnerable households. Social 
and political network effects are no longer significant. Poorer households have a 
significantly higher probability of obtaining public food aid than non-vulnerable 
households in period 2, irrespective of their political connections and their informal 
social safety net.  Again evaluated at the mean values of all other characteristics, 
households at the 25
th, 75
th and 95
th consumption percentile have respectively 46%, 
35% and 28% probability of obtaining free aid. 
10  
 
We also explored the same specification for the probability of obtaining food aid at any 
time between September 2002 and March 2004, but this time adding an interaction term 
of our dummy for political connections with the size of the PA in terms of the number 
of households it contains (not reported). While all other effects remain very similar, we 
find that the political connection effect decreases with the size of the PA: the larger the  




PA, the smaller the positive effect of political connections on the probability of 
obtaining food aid. A priori, if informational advantages were central, we could have 
expected that this effect had been positive, as connections become more important in 
large communities – in any case, it makes the favouritism interpretation harder to 
dismiss.  
 
So far we only looked at the probability of being selected for free food aid receipts, 
without considering potential differences in the amount of food aid received. Column 
(4) shows the OLS results from the second part of the two-part model, explaining the 
amount of food aid received in period 2 for those actually receiving food aid. 
Unfortunately we do not have data available on the amount of food aid received in 
period 1, exactly the period where social network effects turned out to be highly 
significant as shown in column (2). For period 2, we find that allocation of the level of 
aid is just noisy around the mean, or at least we find that the amount of food aid is 
unrelated to social networks and economic needs, with the exception that female headed 
households are receiving about quarter less than the mean payment.  
 
5.3. Food-For-Work targeting results 
Table 4 shows the estimation results of the same probit models as in table 3 but now 
with the probability of participating in FFW as the dependent variable. The targeting 
mechanism used in food-for-work programmes seems to be rather different from the one 
used in FFD. For FFW, there does not seem to be any significant difference between 
period 1 and period 2 targeting patterns (as the discussion of the descriptive statistics 
already alluded to: most people that receive FFW receive FFW in both periods). 
Participation seems to be exclusively based on labour supply characteristics, such as 
work ability, household size and health of male household members. For FFW we find 
no evidence whatsoever of targeting based on economic need. This is consistent with 
the findings of other studies that analyse the targeting outcomes of FFW programmes in 
Ethiopia (Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2000). None of the social networks seem to have 
any significant effect on the probability of participating in FFW. This is rather 
surprising, given that we would expect, in line of Granovetter’s early findings 
(Granovetter, 1975), networks to be generally connected with job acquisitions. Overall, 
these results are consistent with a view of the operation of FFW in which self-selection 
on the basis of labour supply characteristics is central, but at wages that are likely to be  




too high for any meaningful self-selection on the basis of need. The higher visibility of 
FFW, compared to FFD (with people having to work to gain rations) may make 
selection based on political and social patronage harder to sustain.  
 
The results in table 4 are restricted to explaining the probability of participating in FFW. 
They do not tell us anything about the total number of days worked in FFW, nor about 
the amount of food or cash received as rewards under the FFW scheme. Table 5 allows 
us to investigate this further. The OLS estimation results of the second part of the two-
part model using the total value of payment for FFW of those that actually participated 
in the programme suggest that political connections have a significantly positive effect 
on the total value of food/cash received in period 2, with households being politically 
connected having received on average 96 birr (or about a quarter of a standard 
deviation, and 28% of the mean) more than non-politically connected households. This 
effect may be driven by two different sources: either did households that are politically 
connected work at the same daily wage rate as the households that are not politically 
connected, but with the former group working relatively more in terms of number of 
days worked. Or maybe did households that are politically connected work the same 
number of days as the households that are not politically connected, but with the former 
group working at a daily wage rate that was higher than the one paid out to the latter 
group. Or maybe both effects occurred simultaneously.  
 
Exploring this further, columns (2) and (3) suggest that the latter effect dominated in 
period 2. Households with at least one close associate holding official position received 
on average one birr (or about a third of both the mean and the standard deviation) more 
per day worked on FFW than households that did not have such connections. We do not 
find evidence that politically connected households worked significantly more in FFW 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Determinants of food-for-work (FFW) rewards among FFW-participating 
households (OLS, two-part model) 
 
Notes: All models in this table include PA dummies (not reported); Period 2 = Apr. 2003-March 2004; Income per 
capita is measured by total income minus transfers in 1999; Iddir size is scaled (divided by 50); 9 missing and 1 
outlier observations are dropped in regressions (2) and (3). Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors; * sign. 
at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1%. Mean values (standard errors in brackets):  total value 341 (431); days 
worked 78 (73) and daily payment 3.80 (3.33).  
 
 
5.4 Robustness Tests 
It is plausible that social networks and political connections are affected by the food aid 
distribution process, making a causal interpretation of the results above problematic.   
For example, political leaders may use food aid distribution to forge connections and for 
different forms of vote-buying. This is additionally complicated in the data as the data 
on political connections were collected in 2004, after the food aid distribution under 
consideration here had taken place. This is actually much less of a problem than it may 
seem at first. The political leadership was in fact elected in 2001, they were simply in 
Dependent variable 




Total nr of days 
worked in FFW  
Period 2 
OLS 
Daily wage rate FFW 
(value in Birr)   
Period 2   
OLS 
Estimation equation  (1) (2)  (3) 
HH has close associates holding official 
position (VSN)  2004 
96.052*  (53.084)  4.512  (7.255)  0.943*** (0.330) 
No. of persons HH can rely on in times of 
need 2004  
-4.186**  (1.875)  -0.707**  (0.288)  -0.011  (0.016) 
Size of the largest iddir the HH belongs to  
1999 
-3.258  (4.386)  0.687  (0.695)  -0.042  (0.040) 
Ln (real consumption per capita) 1999  -11.734  (24.003)  -1.406  (4.565)  -0.105  (0.201) 
Average ability score of the household head 
2004 (score 1-4)  
22.857  (27.234)  3.103  (4.477)  -0.003  (0.233) 
Proportion of elderly (>65 yrs)  1999  92.865  (198.795)  -2.968  (29.517)  0.652  (1.392) 
Land area owned per capita (hectares)  1999  -9.530  (114.982)  35.762  (27.333)  -0.326  (0.741) 
Ln (household size) 1999  84.680**  (37.613)  27.017***  (7.033)  0.137  (0.324) 
HH head is female  1999  55.710  (43.021)  1.933  (7.597)  0.210  (0.305) 
Proportion of children (< 6 yrs)  1999  -70.811  (103.319) 0.873  (18.643)  -0.373  (0.847) 
HH head is literate  1999  31.590  (43.003) 5.056  (6.659)  0.190  (0.342) 
HH belongs to major religious group of PA 
1999 
-82.859  (74.232) -18.707  (13.730)  0.022  (0.363) 
HH received free food in the past (1982-1999)  -25.451  (107.057) 9.080  (12.719)  0.036  (0.477) 
HH experienced drought, 2000-200  -115.559*  (69.551)  10.409  (8.305)  -0.891  (0.585) 
Male HH member serious illness 1999-2002  123.616  (106.066)  -5.599  (11.294)  1.044  (0.723) 
Female HH member serious illness 1999-2002 -5.474  (61.922)  14.442  (14.114)  -0.108  (0.447) 
Any HH member died, 1999-2002  13.911  (50.905)  18.542**  (9.145)  -0.293  (0.365) 
No. of observations (FFW participants only)  344  334  334 
Adjusted R
2   0.340  0.410  0.384  




power throughout this period, and the subsequent election only took place in 2005. As a 
result, we can be certain that the connections refer to the same leadership as during the 
2002 drought and its aftermath.  
  
Still, it could be the case that the leadership forged additional connections during and 
after the 2002-2003 drought by using food aid (for example to build up a support base 
in view of later elections). In itself, this is still a sign that the local political economy 
matters for food distribution, even though the effects in table 3 can then not be simply 
interpreted as meaning that households with better political connections are managing to 
get food transfers, but possibly evidence of attempted vote-buying. In other words, it 
refers to the interpretation of the observed correlation – and it may be a sign of reverse 
causality. A first step to explore the relevance of such reverse causality in the form of 
food aid distribution affecting political connections (and more generally, all network 
variables) exploits the information on past food-aid (pre-2000). In particular, note that if 
there were reverse causality, we would expect not only current food aid programmes 
but also past food aid programmes to have influenced social networks in 2004. More 
specifically, we would expect the conditional correlation between social networks and 
past (pre-2000) food aid also to be significantly positive. As we found a positive 
conditional correlation between past food aid and the receiving food aid in table 3, the 
hypothesis of reverse causality would imply that omitting past food aid from the 
regression equation would introduce an upward bias in the coefficient estimates of the 
social network variables. When running a regression similar to (1) in table 3 but now 
omitting past food aid (1982-1999), we find that the coefficient estimates for all 
variables remain close to identical (not reported). In particular, the network coefficients 
are identical. Against this, one could argue that past food aid programmes since 1982 
are less relevant for current vertical connections than recent food aid programmes
11. But 
even if we restrict the analysis to past food aid programmes between 1997 and 1999, we 
obtain similar results (not reported). Given that past free food distribution does not seem 
to be linked to current FFW participation (as shown in table 4), we do not expect 
running a model for FFW without past food aid to alter the results. Running the 
regression shows indeed that this is not the case (not reported).  
 
However, this does not show that other sources of unobserved heterogeneity do not 
affect our inference on the impact of social network and political connections variables.  




It might be that social networks, being the result of behavioural decisions, are correlated 
with unobservable household characteristics which in turn are correlated with the 
probability of obtaining food aid. For example, if wealth is correlated with political 
connections, and the current observable wealth variables imperfectly capture wealth, 
then the correlation between political connections and food aid access may be a 
reflection of unobserved heterogeneity in wealth.  
 
Given the recent political history, this is not necessarily what one would expect, with 
two relatively total reversals of economic and political power in rural Ethiopia since the 
1970s. First, after the revolution in 1974, a total land reform saw the government taking 
full control of all land. The vast redistribution of land meant that rich and powerful 
families lost most of their land, and political power came in the hands of a new group of 
cadres. However, in 1991, the government was defeated by rebel forces, and across the 
country, political power came into the hands of a new political leadership and many of 
the previous political leadership across the country lost dramatically also in economic 
terms. While the leadership may be in an (economically) advantaged position, local 
political affiliation (in the form of being connected to the leadership) is not simply 
translated in wealth, not least since power has changed repeatedly in recent times. 
 
Whether the link between political connections and access to food aid is largely via 
political processes in the community, rather than simply via unobservables, can be 
explored further. In particular, acknowledging that there may be a problem of 
unobserved heterogeneity, we use an instrumental variable approach to estimate the 
relationship in equation (1) to get at the relationship between political connections and 
food aid. We use a dummy whether any parent of the household head has held official 
position in the kebele or elsewhere. Since this variable relates to past political 
connections, it is unlikely to impact on the probability of obtaining food aid other than 
through current political connections inherited from the parents.  
 
Note that both our dependent variable (whether food aid is received) and our 
endogenous variable (whether HH has political connections) are binary variables. In 
case of binary regressor(s), standard IV probit estimation leads to inconsistent estimates 
for reasons associated with ‘forbidden regressions’ (Wooldridge, 2002).  There exist 
two common approaches to estimating causal effects in such models, each with their  




own potential drawbacks (Angrist, 1991; Battacharya et al., 2006; World Bank, 2011): 
2SLS estimation disregards the binary structure of the variables and presents linear 
instrumental variables (IV) estimates. The advantage of the 2SLS estimator is its 
computational simplicity and the ability to use post-estimation tests for weakness of the 
instruments. The second approach, i.e. the bivariate probit model, estimates both binary 
variables jointly using a standard maximum likelihood procedure. Both approaches 
yield very similar results for our analysis. To make use of post-estimation tests of 
validity of instruments, we decide to focus on the 2SLS results in this paper.  
 
Column (1) and (2-3) in table 6 present the estimation results for respectively the first 
and second stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation process. We find that the 
instrument is statistically significant at 1 %.  With an implied F-statistic of 28.81, this 
does not seem to be a weak instrument (Steiger and Stock, 1997). Moreover, based on 
the Durban-Wu-Hausman test we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the political 
connection variable is exogenous in both models. Households of which the parents of 
the head held official positions have almost 30 percent higher probability of having 
political connections than other households in the village. The first stage regression also 
shows how political connections appear to have only limited correlation with wealth 
variables or demographic variables, although female headed households are clearly 
much less connected while households headed by a literate person are significantly 
more connected to the political elite.  
 
The last 2 columns in table 6 present the results for the 2SLS second stage regressions 
for FFD and FFW. The results concerning the network variables remain similar as 
before, with political networks and the informal social safety net having a significant 
effect on the probability of obtaining free food, while having no significant effect on the 
probability of participating in FFW. The 2SLS point estimates are larger than implied 
by the probits in table 3 and 4, or the LPM without instrumenting (not reported), but 
also have larger standard errors.  Given the size of these errors, the reduction in 
significance level seems to be due to the loss in estimation precision, but in general, 
they broadly confirm our earlier findings.   In short, there is no clear evidence that 
suggests that unobserved heterogeneity or other endogeneity problems affect our 
conclusions derived earlier.  
  





Table 6. Instrumental Variable Estimations 
Notes: All models in this table include PA dummies (not reported); Consumption per capita is measured by total consumption 
minus transfers in 1999; Iddir size is scaled (divided by 50); Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors; * sign. at 10%; 
** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1%.  
 
It is also possible to explore further whether there is any evidence against reverse 
causality with respect to the link between obtaining food aid and the informal social 
safety net measure. In particular, in line with concerns about crowding out of informal 
security by formal transfer schemes (Dercon and Krishnan, 2003), it may well be that 
the negative relationship between size of the network in the data (measured in 2004) and 
receiving food aid is linked to the fact that those receiving food aid reduced their 
network size, so the correlation would then be just spurious. The data provides us with 
more direct evidence against this interpretation and therefore against reverse causality. 
In particular, the survey not only asked the households about the exact number of 
Dependent variable 




FFD = 1 if HH 
received free food 
2002-2004 














At least one of the head’s  parents has held an official position  0.277***  (0.053)        
HH has close associates holding official position (VSN)  2004      0.302*  (0.177)  0.066  (0.181) 
No. of persons HH can rely on in times of need 2004   0.003  (0.002)  -0.003**  (0.001)  -0.001  (0.002) 
Size of the largest iddir the HH belongs to 1999  0.009  (0.007)  -0.005  (0.008)  -0.005  (0.008) 
Ln (real consumption per capita) 1999  -0.020  (0.030)  -0.062**  (0.030)  0.022  (0.029) 
Average ability score of the household head 2004 (score 1-4)   0.045  (0.035)  -0.104***  (0.032)  0.149***  (0.035) 
Proportion of elderly (>65 yrs)  1999  0.034  (0.167)  -0.004  (0.131)  0.110  (0.162) 
Land area owned per capita (hectares)  1999  -0.132  (0.121)  -0.237**  (0.113)  0.123  (0.096) 
Ln (household size) 1999  -0.045  (0.048)  -0.137***  (0.050)  0.099**  (0.048) 
HH head is female  1999 ˜  -0.117**  (0.047)  0.016  (0.051)  -0.086*  (0.048) 
Proportion of children (< 6 yrs)  1999  -0.122  (0.125)  -0.037  (0.127)  0.072  (0.128) 
HH head is literate 1999  ˜  0.111**  (0.045)  -0.019  (0.050)  0.013  (0.048) 
HH belongs to major religious group of PA 1999˜  -0.022  (0.055)  -0.027  (0.052)  0.005  (0.055) 
HH received free food in the past (1982-1999) ˜  -0.059  (0.063)  0.134*  (0.073)  -0.011  (0.067) 
HH experienced drought, 2000-2002˜  0.062  (0.049)  0.004  (0.051)  0.053  (0.050) 
Male HH member serious illness 1999-2002˜  -0.107  (0.082)  0.070  (0.076)  -0.165**  (0.084) 
Female HH member serious illness 1999-2002˜  0.043  (0.080)  0.042  (0.072)  -0.005  (0.077) 
Any HH member died, 1999-2002˜  0.005  (0.047)  0.026  (0.048)  -0.001  (0.045) 
Number of observations  602 602  602 
(Pseudo) R
2  0.189 0.187  0.202 
 F-statistic instrument  28.81     




people they could rely on in 2004, but also on whether their informal security network 
had remained the same, increased or decreased compared to 1999. Table 7 shows the 
frequency of the answers for the food-receiving and free-food-receiving household 
groups and the FFW participants and non-participants separately.  
 
Table 7. Change in informal social safety net (ISSN) 1999-2004
 
   Share  of 
households with no 




















Free food receiving 
group  
(356 observations) 
35.67 30.34 33.99 
t-statistic difference 
in shares between 2 
groups 
-1.27 0.94 0.34 
FFW 
Group NOT 
participating in FFW 
(223 observations) 




35.34 28.49 36.16 
t-statistic difference 
in shares between 2 
groups  
-1.10 2.21
**  -1.07 
  Full sample (588)  33.67  31.80  34.52 
 
The results show that there is no statistically significant relationship between 
participating in the free food program and the change in the household’s support 
network. This suggests that participating in the free food aid program has not 
systematically influenced the informal social safety net. As for FFW, there seems to be 
a significant difference in the share of households that claimed to have experienced an 
increase in ISSN since 1999. However, the difference seems to be in the opposite 
direction than we would expect, as more households not participating in FFW seem to 
have increased their ISSN than those participating in FFW.  Hence, this would not 




A large part of the Ethiopian population continues to regularly rely on transfers in the 
form of food aid, delivered via donors and the government. There is little known about  




how the local political economy and networks affect their allocation, even though 
targeting is largely administrative based implemented by the local political leadership. 
This paper offers evidence on these processes.  
 
Official rules and commitments make it clear that free food aid is targeted to those at 
risk of hunger and poverty, with limited access to alternative means of support, 
including via working on food-for-work or other forms of support. Most evidence 
suggests that targeting is correlated with observable characteristics reflecting needs, but 
that it is imperfect (Jayne et al. 2001; Gilligan and Hoddinott, 2007). In practice, 
targeting in food aid distribution in Ethiopia depends on local political leaders, within 
the Kebele administration, in principle elected but in practice typically closely linked to 
those in power regionally and nationally. By lack of objectively verifiable information 
on need, effective targeting also depends on the needy being able to effectively 
communicate this need or enforce their rights.  
 
We study the role of social networks and political connections in the allocation of food 
aid in rural Ethiopia, focusing on food aid distributed in the aftermath of one of the 
largest relief operations of recent years. We use data of a household panel data survey 
that collected information on food aid transfers during and after a serious drought in 
2002. Controlling for baseline characteristics typically correlated with the type of 
people that rules suggest should be targeted, we find that those with larger social 
networks for informal insurance have less access to food aid. On average, for each 
additional person the household can rely on, the probability of obtaining food aid 
decreases with almost 1 percentage point. More strikingly, we find that households in 
‘vertical’ networks, measured by households having close associates holding official 
positions, have 12 percentage points higher probability of obtaining food aid than other 
households in the village that are not vertically connected.  We find strong differences 
between the immediate post-drought period, where political connections are strong and 
significant, as well as directly observable factors related to temporary need, such as 
having suffered from the drought, and the subsequent 12 months, in which more general 
“need” variables dominate. Nevertheless, even in this later period, political connections 
appear to matter for the size of the transfers received. The allocation of food-for-work 
appears to be based largely on labour supply characteristics linked to ability to work,  




and not need nor political or social connections. However, the level of support received, 
in terms of total or daily payment received, appears to be linked to political networks.  
 
There are many ways in which this relationship can be understood. It could be 
informational: being connected with those holding official positions may improve 
information flows, for example in terms of signalling need or availability of support. 
This idea is not supported by subjective data that we have available: The share of 
households that reported to have been well-informed about how food assistance would 
be allocated was even slightly higher for households without any politically connections 
than for those with political affiliation, i.e. 37% versus 30% respectively. As these 
Peasant Associations are usually not more than about 500 households, and also given 
some of our tests conducted in this paper, improved information is unlikely to be the 
full story. Favouritism is a plausible explanation, irrespective of whether those 
households actually need the food aid or not. This is a striking result, leaving less well-
connected households with real needs without support. We have to be careful not to 
overstate these results, as correlations with ‘need’ variables remain important. But in 
future programmes, it will be worth looking deeper into the political economy of these 
villages.  Looking for ways to increase accountability of local Kebele committees will 
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ENDNOTES 
1 Gilligan and Hoddinott’s data are less well suited to study the first stage of the targeting 
system, from the central government to the districts (Woredas). Using a large national data set, 
relating to food aid distribution in the mid-1990s, Jayne et al. (2001) showed considerable 
inertia in food aid allocations to specific regions and areas, and large variation in the household-
level allocation rules across regions.  
2 The importance of social capital and political connectivity at the community level in 
explaining differences between communities in their food aid targeting processes is of course 
also of interest. It may be, for instance, that the degree of successful food aid targeting of a 
community is related to its degree of political connectedness to the district administration, as 
well as their social cohesion, trust and control. The available data are unlikely to be most 
suitable for this, as we only have a limited number of Peasant Associations (15) in the data. 
3 This property of social networks is, for obvious reasons, often used in the job search literature 
(Lin, 2001).   
4 These five questions were, “can this person: 1) Stand up after sitting down? 2) Sweep the 
floor? 3) Walk for 5 km? 4) Carry 20 liter of water for 20m? 5) Hoe a field for a morning?” 
5 The measure is only available for round 6, but this is unlikely to have changed significantly 
over time; never theless, the potential endogeneity with food aid is explored further below. 
6 We explored other measures for the strength of the iddir, but the data on the value of benefits 
of the iddir proved too incomplete to pursue across all the villages. Bold and Dercon (2009) use 
more data collected on all the iddirs for a sub-sample, but this sub-sample proved too small for 
the purposes in this paper. Data limitations also prohibited us from using the sum of the 
members of all iddirs the household belonged to, instead of taking the size of the largest iddir.   
7 The data on these political connections were collected in round 6, although political office had 
not changed since the elections of 2001, before the drought crisis; any consequences for the 
analysis are discussed further below. 
8 Note that in the reported regressions, we did not include livestock ownership, although it does 
reflect a criterion of the PA leaders. Including livestock, together with consumption and land 
ownership, does not change any of the results and does not show any significant effect of 
livestock. However, it appears to cause problems of multicollinearity, affecting significance 
levels of other variables. Since only one PA claimed to be using livestock ownership as a target 
criterion and since its coefficient estimate in the regressions is never significant, we believe that 
avoiding multicollinearity problems is a preferable choice. We fully recognize that land 
ownership and real consumption are also highly correlated, but as we will see in the regressions, 
land ownership has a very significant impact on the food distribution process. Hence, we decide 
to include it in the regression model.  
9 This is due to data limitations, as explained in the previous section. 
10 Nevertheless, these effects are still estimated with a high standard error, and a full pooling test 
between the two periods suggest that overall, the differences are not significant, despite the 
significance of individual results. 
11 For example, because those who were in charge of food distribution in the 1980s are likely no 
longer to be in charge in 2002.  